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There are many inequalities in US tariff policy. Products 
imported from certain countries enter duty free, while nearly 
identical products from other countries are heavily taxed. 
Tariffs on agricultural products are systematically higher than 
those on manufactured goods. Tariffs on some categories of 
manufactured goods—such as shoes or cotton shirts—depend 
on the gender of the intended consumer. Some of these tariff 
differences have a rational basis in the policy interests of the 
United States. However, differential taxation of apparel based 
on gender cannot be defended and should be abolished.  
In May 2014, the US Su-
preme Court refused to 
hear appeals from import-
ers Rack Room Shoes Inc. 
and Forever 21 Inc., thereby 
blocking their attempts to 
challenge an earlier ruling 
by the Court of Internation-
al Trade. The importers had 
argued before the Court of 
International Trade that US 
Federal Government tariffs 
on apparel and footwear 
were discriminatory since 
WHAT’S THE TAKEAWAY? 
 
Tariff rates on many articles of 
apparel and footwear are based 
on the gender of the intended 
user. 
 
On average the tariffs paid on 
goods for women are higher 
than those for men. 
 
Tariffs harm American 
consumers.   
 
The best solution to these 
discriminatory tariffs would be 
to eliminate tariffs on apparel 
and footwear altogether. 
2 
those tariff rates were based on gender, ra-
ther than non-gender factors like the com-
position of materials, the weight of materi-
als, the size of an article, or the function of 
an article. The Court of International Trade 
dismissed the plaintiffs’ case, concluding 
that they fell short of proving the lawmakers 
had any discriminatory intent.1 
The courts may have concluded that Con-
gress had no discriminatory intent, but there 
is little doubt that gender-based tariffs have 
discriminatory impact. Research demon-
strates that the burden of tariffs falls heavi-
ly—and in many cases exclusively—on the 
consumer. So when the tariff on women’s 
leather shoes is higher than the tariff on 
men’s leather shoes (which it is), women 
feel the pain. 
Global producers have the option of selling 
their product in Europe, Canada, or Japan 
instead of the United States. They will not 
accept from US consumers a price that is 
anything less than what they can receive 
from consumers elsewhere in the world. The 
world price is set in the global marketplace 
and is unlikely to change just because the 
United States imposes a tariff. If the world 
price is $20 and the US tariff rate is 10%, 
then the US consumer pays $22 and the 
global producers receive the same $20 they 
would have received in the absence of a tariff. 
Furthermore, even consumers who only buy 
American-made goods are stung by the higher 
prices tariffs induce. Tariffs protect domestic 
producers from competition, thereby raising 
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There is little doubt that 
gender-based tariffs have 
a discriminatory impact, 
since the burden of tariffs 
falls almost exclusively on 
consumers. 
Figure 1: Gender-based Tariff Differentials 
Source: US Harmonized Tariff Schedule 
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classified goods. In some cases, the tariff is 
higher for menswear; in other cases, it is low-
er.  
When we consider the quantities imported in 
each category, however, a pattern emerges  
(see figure 2). The average tariff rate for 
women’s apparel is systematically higher than 
the average tariff rate for men’s apparel. (The 
average tariff rate for women’s footwear is 
also higher than the average men’s rate, but 
the difference is not statistically significant.) 
On average, the tax on imported clothing for 
men is 11.9% while the tax on imported cloth-
ing for women is 15.1%, or more than 3 per-
centage points higher. We calculate that in 
2014, buyers of imported clothing and foot-
wear paid at least $330 million more in taxes 
than they would have paid had there been no 
gender-based tariff differentials. And because 
higher tariffs lead to higher prices for domes-
tically produced goods, the actual burden of 
the tariff differentials was even greater. 
SHOULD APPAREL & FOOTWEAR 
TARIFFS BE ELIMINATED? 
Arguably, US tariffs on apparel should be re-
moved altogether. Tariffs are some of the 
most distortionary and therefore inefficient 
3 
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the price of the product, regardless of wheth-
er it was manufactured at home or abroad. 
Either way, American consumers overpay. 
And when the tariff is higher for women’s 
goods than it is for menswear, American 
women really overpay. 
In 2014, 86% of US apparel imports and 79% 
of US footwear imports were gender-
classified by the United States International 
Trade Commission (USITC).2 Gender-classified 
goods are those where the sex of the intended 
consumer is part of the product description. 
For example, the USITC differentiates be-
tween men’s or boy’s cotton shirts3 and wom-
en’s or girl’s cotton shirts and blouses.4 Gen-
der-classified goods do not include items 
commonly worn by only one gender (such as 
brassieres or bow ties) because they are fully 
classified by a description of the product. 
In many cases, there is no difference in the 
tariff for men’s goods and women’s goods. 
However, as figure 1 shows, in a surprising 
number of cases, there are large differences. 
The tariff on women’s silk shirts, for example,  
is six times the tariff on men’s silk shirts.  
There seems to be no underlying pattern ex-
plaining the differentials in tariffs for gender-
On average, the tax on 
imported clothing for men 
is 11.9% while the tax on 
imported clothing for 
women is 15.1%, or more 
than 3 percentage points 
higher.  
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Figure 2: Average US Tariff Rates, 2014 
forms of taxation. The costs they impose on 
consumers more than outweigh the tariff rev-
enues and the benefits they generate for do-
mestic industries—particularly when the do-
mestic industry is small. According to the US 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, there are fewer 
than 160,000 jobs in apparel and footwear 
manufacturing nationwide.5 With apparel and 
footwear tariff revenues nearing $14 billion 
per year,6 US consumers are paying the equiv-
alent of $87,000 in taxes annually for each job 
in the apparel and footwear manufacturing 
industries. The government could provide 
retraining or other industry supports for a 
fraction of the cost. Furthermore, eliminating 
US apparel and footwear tariffs would provide 
developing countries—which are dispropor-
tionately the sources of apparel and footwear 
imports—with greater access to US markets, 
thereby increasing US influence in the world.  
Even if eliminating apparel and footwear tar-
iffs altogether is unrealistic, the gender bias 
inherent in the tariff code must be addressed. 
Fortunately, it can be overcome with relative 
ease. Congress could simply declare that im-
porters have the option of paying either the 
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men’s or the women’s tariff rate, whichever is 
lower. Alternatively, Congress could ban tariff 
differentials on products that are gender-
classified, but otherwise identical. Regardless 
of the approach, rectifying the arbitrary, gen-
der driven differentials in the harmonized tar-
iff code would relieve consumers from the 
unfair and capricious burden of discriminato-
ry taxes.  
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